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This paper uses the European Commission’s Consumer Survey to assess whether inflation 
expectations have converged and whether inflation uncertainty has diminished following the 
introduction of the Euro in Europe. Consumers’ responses to the survey suggest that inflation 
expectations depend more on past national inflation rates than on the ECB’s anchor for price 
stability. The convergence in inflation expectations does not appear to be faster than the 
convergence in actual inflation rates. Regarding inflation uncertainty, the data indicate a 
relationship with country size, suggesting that within EMU, inflation uncertainty may 
increase in countries that have a smaller influence on ECB policy. 
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providing the Consumer Survey data. The results in this paper do not reflect the views of the 
European Commission. 1. Introduction 
Why should the European Central Bank (ECB) care about regional differences in 
inflation rates across the Eurozone? In general, the ECB focuses on average economic 
conditions in the Eurozone and attempts to ignore national idiosyncrasies as much as 
possible. This focus seems to fall within the parameters of its mandate to maintain 
price stability in the Eurozone as a whole. It is also in line with the absence of 
instruments to fine-tune monetary policy to cyclical circumstances in individual EMU 
countries. However, in a recent paper the ECB (2003) acknowledges that its monetary 
policy must consider the size, persistence and determinants of differences in inflation 
rates.
1 The ECB is targeting a European-wide consumer price index, yet nobody in the 
monetary union consumes according to this price index. The recent inflation 
experience in the Eurozone underpins the ECB’s concern. After the introduction of 
the Euro, the cross-country variation in the inflation rates of Member States has not 
fallen quickly. In the run-up to EMU all countries with the exception of Greece 
fulfilled the inflation criterion of the Maastricht Treaty. However, in each year since 
1999, three or more countries have failed to fulfil the Maastricht criterion.  
 
In an integrated market such as the Euro Area, inflation differentials across countries 
arise as an integral part of catching up and adjustment mechanisms to shocks. 
Policymakers’ main concern is that inflation differentials are more than just 
temporary deviations from the Eurozone average. Consequently, in EMU monetary 
policy has real effects because monetary policy affects the real interest rate which in 
                                                 
1 The ECB (2003, p. 6) writes “[...] the ECB’s monetary policy strategy attributes a secondary role to 
inflation differentials when calibrating the safety margin for admissible inflation in the Euro Area”. 
  2turn affects aggregate spending decisions. With a uniform nominal interest rate, the 
domestic real interest rates will be lower in high inflation regions, discouraging 
savings and stimulating consumption and investment. In comparison to a monetary 
policy that is conducted nationally via a Taylor-type interest rate rule, within a 
monetary union the real interest rate channel no longer acts as a brake on the cycle but 
instead may accelerate regional economic developments. This effect may be further 
amplified by wealth effects, as low real interest rates may inflate share and real estate 
prices. The sole remaining countervailing force is the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. However, the elimination of nominal exchange rates within the union 
reduces the speed with which this variable adjusts. Adjustment mechanisms of real 
appreciation or depreciation likely operate only at a slow pace. 
 
Empirical evidence on the size and persistence of inflation differentials is provided by 
Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (2002) for US cities, by Rogers (2001), Berk and Swank 
(2002) and Ortega (2003) for European countries and by Alberola and Marqués 
(1999) for Spanish provinces. Overviews are provided by Angeloni and Ehrmann 
(2004) and Gadzinski and Orlandi (2004). Most empirical studies conclude that 
relative price levels between regions converge at a surprisingly slow rate; in case of 
US cities the half-life of convergence is approximately nine years. Persistent inflation 
differences may influence inflationary expectations and can amplify regional business 
cycles. The vulnerability of the adjustment mechanism to self-reinforcing effects 
within a monetary union is discussed in Honohan and Lane (2003), Arnold and Kool 
(2004), Deroose, Langedijk and Roeger (2004) and Hofmann and Remsperger (2005).  
 
  3The literature on cross-country inflation dispersion in the Eurozone and their effects 
on macroeconomic adjustment has focused on actual inflation rates. This has evoked 
strong criticism from among others the ECB (2004). According to the ECB (2004), 
the use of actual instead of expected inflation rates will exaggerate cross-country 
differences. The ECB argues that economic agents should be able to foresee the 
consequences of regional inflation differentials for a region’s competitive position and 
understand the implications of the ECB’s price stability objective. Economic agents 
should therefore conclude that, in the medium to long run, inflation divergences 
cannot last. In theory, they will adjust their inflation expectations accordingly. For 
macroeconomic adjustment the relevant interest rates are the ex ante real rates, not the 
ex post real rates. Using Consensus inflation forecasts, the ECB (2004) shows that the 
dispersion in ex ante real rates is lower than the dispersion in ex post real rates. Table 
1 reproduces the main ECB findings. The dispersion of ex ante rates is 30-35% lower 
for short-term rates and almost 60% lower for long-term rates. 
Table 1: Dispersion in real interest rates 




















        
unweighted 0.53  0.80  0.26  0.62 
weighted 0.45  0.70  0.23  0.57 
        
Source: ECB (2004), p. 34. 
This paper adds the following contributions to the debate. Using data from the 
European Commission’s Consumer Survey we attempt to corroborate the ECB 
findings that cross-country differences in expected inflation rates (used to calculate ex 
ante real rates) are smaller than cross-country differences in actual inflation rates 
  4(used to calculate ex post real rates). An advantage of the use of the Consumer Survey 
is that it provides a direct measure of consumers’ inflation expectations. A limitation 
is that it confines the analysis to short-term (one-year ahead) inflation expectations. 
Nevertheless, this allows a comparison with the short-term Consensus inflation 
forecasts in Table 1. In contrast to the Consensus Forecasts that summarize the views 
of a limited number of professional economists, the Consumer Survey is based on a 
large-scale survey among consumers. We hypothesize that professional economists 
may be better placed to deduct the theoretical implications of monetary union for the 
convergence in inflation rates than ordinary consumers. The Consensus data might 
therefore demonstrate more convergence in inflationary expectations than actually 
exists among the public (according to the Consumer Survey data). A low convergence 
of inflation expectations among the public might subsequently reinforce inflation 
persistence through its effect on the wage- and price-setting process. After deriving 
quantitative estimates of expected inflation from the qualitative survey data using the 
so-called probability approach, we estimate a model to test for beta-convergence in 
consumers’ inflation expectations. In addition to our analysis of inflation 
expectations, we document and analyze the development in inflation uncertainty in 
EMU Member States before and after the introduction of the Euro.  
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the Consumer Survey 
data and the methodology used to extract quantitative inflation expectations from 
these data. Section 3 reports the empirical findings. Using the Consumer Survey data, 
we are unable to detect a significantly stronger convergence in inflation expectations 
than the convergence in actual inflation rates. Drawing from the empirical findings 
there thus seems to be no substantial evidence that consumers use EMU to anchor 
  5their inflation expectations to the price stability objective of the ECB. Instead, the 
formation of inflation expectations seems to depend mainly on past national inflation 
rates. We also confirm the generally accepted link between the inflation rate and 
inflation uncertainty. Moreover, since 1999 an interesting new link has arisen between 
country size and inflation uncertainty. Section 4 summarizes and concludes our 
findings on inflation expectations and inflation uncertainty. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
Our data on inflation expectations consists of the European Commission’s Consumer 
Survey. The Consumer Survey asks approximately 50,000 people in the Eurozone 
about their expectations regarding developments in the consumer price level over the 
following year. The data are collected monthly. The survey is conducted nationally. 
Each country’s sample consists of at least 1500 consumers. For the larger countries 
(France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) the sample size was increased to 2000, 
and for Germany to 2500. The results from these surveys are available since 1985 
except for Luxemburg and for member countries which entered the European Union 
later (Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland). Across all countries, consumers are asked the 
following identical question on future price developments (Question 6): “By 
comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect consumer prices will develop 
in the next 12 months? They will … 
1.…increase more rapidly, 
2.…increase at the same rate, 
3.…increase at a slower rate, 
4.…stay about the same, 
  65.…fall, 
6….don’t know.” 
In principle, the survey responses provide only qualitative information on the 
expected direction of the change in inflation in the next 12 months. Usually the 
responses are summarized in the form of a “balance statistic”, computed as a 
difference among the proportion of consumers opting for the different response 
categories. For Question (6), the balance is calculated as follows: 
 
 
11 12 4 5
22 () ( tt t t t ) , Balance S S S S =+ − +  (1) 
 
where S
i refers to the sample proportion for the corresponding response category. 
 
A sizable amount of literature has developed on the extraction of quantitative 
estimates of expected inflation from qualitative survey data using the so-called 
probability approach. Early contributions are by Carlson and Parkin (1975) and 
Batchelor and Orr (1988). More recent contributions are by Reckwerth (1997), Berk 
(1999, 2000), Gerberding (2001), Forsells and Kenny (2004) and Paloviita (2004). 
The main idea is to interpret the share of responses to each category as estimates of 
areas under the density function of aggregate inflation expectations (i.e. as 
probabilities). This approach requires the specification of the distribution function. 
  7Following Gerberding (2001), we use the logistic distribution.
2 The solutions for the 
mean expected inflation ( 12
e
t π + ) and its standard deviation ( 12
e
t σ + ) are in equations (2) 
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-1 is the inverse of the cumulative logistic distribution function. 
 
As the wording of the survey question indicates, the consumers are assumed to 
condition their inflation expectations on their perceptions of past inflation. This is also 
reflected in the formulas (3) and (4), which include past inflation (
p
t π ). This paper 
follows Gerberding (2001) in using the actual growth rate in the national consumer 
                                                 
2 Because of the Central Limit Theorem, the aggregate density function is usually assumed to follow a 
normal or logistic distribution. According to Gerberding (2001), both alternatives lead to very similar 
results. 
  8price index over the past twelve months, as monthly inflation data are published on a 
timely basis in all Eurozone countries. 
 
3. Empirical findings 
This section reports our empirical findings. In subsection 3.1 we examine the 
convergence in expected inflation in the Eurozone and its consequences for ex ante 
real interest rates. Subsection 3.2 provides evidence of inflation uncertainty within 
members of the Eurozone and its relationship with inflation and country size. 
 
3.1 Convergence in inflation expectations 
Prior to reviewing the constructed quantitative estimates of inflationary expectations, 
Figure 1 shows some evidence on cross-country differences using the raw qualitative 
survey data. The graph plots the cross-sectional dispersion of the balance of the 
responses to Question 6 of the Consumer Survey (see equation (1) in Section 2). The 
dispersion is measured as the standard deviation across 9 (11 from 1995) EMU 
Member States. Two striking features emerge from Figure 1. First, our balance 
measure shows minimal sign of convergence. Second, since the introduction of the 
Euro the cross-sectional standard deviation in the balance of responses has even 
reached an all-time high in 2003.  
 
The balance data by themselves, however, do not provide sufficient evidence of lack 
of convergence. It is possible that countries with low past inflation rates have high 
balance scores (indicating a higher expected inflation) and conversely, resulting in a 
  9convergence of inflation expectations, although the data would still show a high level 
of dispersion across the balance scores. We therefore need to look at the quantitative 
estimates of expected inflation derived using the methodology outlined in the 
previous section.  
Figure 1: Cross-section standard deviations on balance of Question 6, Consumer Survey 
igure 2 plots time series for expected inflation over the period 1995-2004. It 
becomes evident that, apart from Greece, inflation expectations in the pre-EMU 
period (1995-1999) were much closer across EMU countries than after the 
introduction of the Euro. Since 1999 the smaller EMU countries (Ireland, Netherlands 
and Portugal) have taken turns to have the highest inflation expectations. We will 
further review the relationship with country size in Section 3.2. Figure 2 shows that 
before 1999, Greek expected inflation converges from a much higher level to the 
European level than expected inflation in other European countries. In order to assess 
the effects of this extreme pattern in Greek expected inflation, we will report results 






























  10having a more recent experience of high (expected) inflation, Greece also joined 
EMU at a later stage (in 2001) than the other European countries. In our view, this 
different path towards EMU warrants reporting our results both including and 
excluding Greece.    
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Figure 3 shows the cross-sectional dispersion of the time-series in Figure 2, and 
compares it with the dispersion in actual inflation rates. As Greece is the odd one out 
in the pre-EMU period, Figure 3 also plots the dispersion in expected inflation 
excluding the Greek inflation expectations. Two observations stand out from this 
graph. First, the dispersion in inflation expectations and actual inflation rates is very 
similar. In the start of the sample period, the expectations had a higher dispersion than 
the actual rates; from 1998 to 2003 the two series are very close and only very 
recently has expectational dispersion dropped below actual dispersion. Second, we 
  11may conclude that there has not been a quick convergence in inflation expectations 
since 1999. Inflation expectations seem to reflect past national inflation rates more 
than the nominal anchor provided by the ECB’s objective to hold inflation below, but 
close to 2%. Third, the Greek outlier also matters for the dispersion of inflation 
expectations. When we exclude Greece from the sample as from 2001, we see that 
after the start of EMU expectational dispersion has been higher than in the run-up to 
EMU.  
Figure 3: Cross-sectional standard deviations, 12-month forward-looking inflation 
 
expectations, derived from Question 6, Consumer Survey and actual inflation 
To analyze the progress towards convergence of inflation expectations, we need 
indicators that can summarize the convergence over time of financial variables. We 
use the concept of beta-convergence borrowed from the growth literature and applied 
to the convergence of Eurozone interest rates by Adam et al. (2002) and Baele et al. 
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  12growth literature regress the average growth rate of real per capita GDP on its initial 
level for a cross-section of (regions within) countries and interprete a negative beta as 
sign of convergence (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995, Chapters 11 & 12). Applied to 
inflation expectations, this involves running a panel regression of the following type: 




ti i t i t li ti
l
EE E , π αβ π π ε −−
=
∆= + + ∆ + ∑  (5) 
where  Eπt,i denotes expected inflation at time t in country i and ∆ is the first 
difference operator and αi is a country dummy. The more negative beta in (5), the 
faster the convergence of the country will be towards the other European countries. So 
the concept of beta-convergence investigates how the dispersion of a cross-section of 
countries develops in terms of levels. A different concept of convergence investigates 
how the cross-sectional dispersion develops in terms of standard deviations or 
variances. When this dispersion decreases over time, we say there is sigma-
convergence. The concept of beta-convergence is more appropriate for our purpose 
than the concept of sigma-convergence since the ECB aims at keeping the level of 
inflation for the Euro Area as a whole below, but close to 2% in the medium term.  
 
Table 2 reports econometric evidence on the speed of the convergence of inflation 
expectations. The specification in Table 2 deviates in four respects from (5). First, the 
lagged changes in expected inflation were insignificant and therefore have been 
eliminated from the regression. Second, our regression includes the lagged log of 
OECD comparative price levels (log(cplt-1,i)). This variable is included to account for 
possibly catching-up effects: inflation expectations may be higher in those countries 
where the price level is still low compared with other Eurozone countries (and vice 
  13versa). Third, our regressions include not only cross-sectional fixed effects but also 
period fixed effects. The use of period fixed effects has the same effect as taking all 
variables in deviation from the cross-sectional average. The interpretation of (5) is 
then as follows: a negative beta implies that members with above-average inflation 
expectations will witness an stronger-than-average reduction or smaller-than-average 
increase in inflation expectations in the next period. Finally, we use a dummy variable 
(DEMU) to identify the EMU period and apply this to the beta-coefficient. The 
resulting interaction term allows us to assess whether the convergence of inflation 
expectations has changed since the start of EMU. 
 
The regression model is estimated for three datasets: a long sample running from July 
1986 to September 2004 but excluding Greece, Austria and Finland (the first country 
because of its extreme inflation history and late entry into EMU, the latter two 
because of data unavailability) and two shorter samples running from December 1995 
to September 2004, one including and one excluding the Greek outlier. The panel 
regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors have been calculated using the 
White period methodology to account for serial correlation due to the use of 
overlapping monthly data for 12-month (expected) inflation. 
 
The main findings are as follows. All regressions report significant convergence; the 
estimated beta-coefficient on lagged expected inflation is statistically significant in all 
three specifications. Our catching-up variable (log(cplt-1,i)) is always insignificant. 
The most interesting finding in Table 2 is the value and significance of the EMU 
interaction term (Επτ−1,ι*DEMU). The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant 
  14in both the long sample and in the short sample including Greece. It has, however, the 
anticipated negative sign, according to which EMU membership would lead to a 
stronger convergence. These results imply that EMU has not led to a significantly 
stronger convergence in inflation expectations. The regression for the shorter sample 
period excluding Greece (see the second column of Table 2) yields a positive and 
significant coefficient for the interaction term, implying that the convergence in 
inflation expectations has become weaker since the start of EMU. Given the strong 
convergence of Greek expected inflation to that of other countries before 1999, this 
result is unsurprising. The coefficient on lagged expected inflation is also much larger 
here compared with the other two specifications. These estimates correspond to the 
visual impression from Figures 2 and 3: strong convergence in expected inflation in 
the run-up towards EMU combined with a relaxation in the process of convergence 
after 1999.  Whether we include Greece or not, we can reject the hypothesis that the 
EMU interaction term is negative at a 10% significance level. We therefore conclude 
that EMU has not led to faster convergence in inflation expectations.  
 
To account for possible heterogeneity in beta convergence between large and small 
EMU countries, Table 2 also includes regressions results using a small country 
dummy variable  (DSMALL). This dummy variable is set to zero for Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain and to one for all other countries. Regressions with DSMALL are done 
for the short samples including and excluding Greece. Without Greece, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms including DSMALL are insignificantly different 
from zero at a 5% level. When we include Greece, the interaction term for DSMALL 
becomes significantly positive, implying lower beta convergence among small 
countries. This finding illustrates the special nature of the Greek inflation 
  15convergence during this period. We also checked for but didn’t find any asymmetries 
in beta convergence between countries with downwards and upwards inflation 
expectations. These results go unreported. 






















dependent variable:  ∆Επt,i ∆Επt,i ∆Επt,i ∆Επt,i ∆Επt,i
explanatory 
variables:        
intercept  1.18 0.55 0.65 -1.66  -1.12 
  (0.93) (0.37) (0.38) (1.22)  (-0.71) 
Επt-1,i -0.032 -0.109 -0.128 -0.044  -0.114 
  (6.17) (11.27)  (10.69) (5.56)  (8.42) 
Επt-1,I*DEMU -0.014 0.041 0.022 -0.048  -0.029 
  (1.22) (3.85) (1.37) (1.58)  (0.91) 
Επt-1,I*DSMALL    0.030    0.074 
     (1.67)    (5.13) 
Επt-1,I*DEMU*DSMALL    0.009    -0.016 
     (0.41)    (0.79) 
log(cplt-1,i)  -0.245 -0.090 -0.112 0.398  0.283 
 (0.86)  (0.29)  (0.30)  (1.30)  (0.80) 
          
# observations  1736 1060 1060 1166  1166 
Adj. R
2 0.176 0.23 0.23  0.21  0.22 
        
Panel estimates with cross-sectional fixed effects and period fixed effects; t-statistics in 
parentheses, calculated with White period standard errors. 
 
For the purpose of comparison, Table 3 reports similar estimates for actual inflation 
convergence. It shows that the patterns across the three samples are very similar 
compared with Table 2. The coefficients on lagged inflation are also close to those on 
lagged expected inflation. Thus, the regressions do not seem to support the notion of 
stronger convergence in inflation expectations as compared with actual inflation rates. 
In order to check the robustness of our results to the quantification of the survey data, 
we finally tested for convergence using the qualitative balance scores, see equation 
(1). Table 4 shows the beta coefficients to be negative and significantly different from 
  16zero. This estimate of the beta coefficient implies that an above-average balance score 
in the previous period leads to a below-average increase in the balance score in the 
next period. The EMU-interaction term is, however, insignificant in all three 
specifications, implying that EMU has not led to stronger convergence in balance 
scores to the Eurozone average.  
Table 3: Convergence in inflation  
period:  1986.07-2004.09 1995.12-2004.09 1995.12-2004.09 
countries:  EMU excluding  FI, 
AT, EL  EMU excluding EL  EMU 
dependent variable: ∆πt,i ∆πt,i ∆πt,i
explanatory 
variables:     
intercept  2.14 2.53 -1.31 
  (2.47) (1.31)  (0.979) 
πt-1,i -0.031 -0.112 -0.052 
  (6.76) (8.70) (2.66) 
πt-1,I*DEMU -0.006 0.056 -0.014 
  (0.39) (3.88) (0.52) 
log(cplt-1,i)  -0.455 -0.523 -0.260 
  (2.34) (1.23) (0.88) 
     
# observations  1736 1060 1166 
Adj. R
2 0.177 0.23  0.25 
     
Panel estimates with cross-sectional fixed effects and period fixed effects; t-statistics in 
parentheses, calculated with White period standard errors. 
 
 
We can now summarize the conclusions on convergence as follows. The data show 
that significant beta-convergence has occurred in inflation rates, balance scores and 
constructed inflation expectations. There is, however, no evidence that EMU has 
accelerated the process of convergence. If anything, the data suggest that after strong 
convergence in the run-up to EMU, convergence has become weaker since. The 
estimates also do not support the hypothesis that the convergence in inflation 
expectations is more pronounced that the convergence in actual inflation rates. These 
findings support the evidence in Figure 3, showing comparable dispersion in actual 
  17and expected inflation rates. Applied to the distinction between ex ante and ex post 
real interest rates, we are unable to corroborate the ECB’s finding that, using 
Consensus data, the dispersion in ex ante real rates is much lower than the dispersion 
in ex post rates. In contrast, the Consumer Survey data suggest a similar dispersion of 
ex ante and ex post real interest rates. A likely explanation for this result is that 
consumers’ inflation expectations rather than professional economists’ inflation 
expectations depend more on past inflation.  
Table 4: Convergence in balance scores 
period:  1986.07-2004.09 1995.12-2004.09 1995.12-2004.09 
countries:  EMU excluding  FI, 
AT, EL  EMU excluding EL  EMU 
dependent variable: ∆Balancet,i ∆Balancet,i ∆Balancet,i
explanatory 
variables:     
Intercept  -14.27 27.61 28.98 
  (1.19) (0.66) (0.83) 
Balancet-1,i -0.097 -0.112 -0.094 
  (4.53) (3.27) (4.08) 
Balancet-1,I*DEMU -0.022 0.013 -0.017 
  (0.87) (0.31) (0.45) 
log(cplt-1,i)  3.622 -5.716 -6.004 
  (1.37) (0.62) (0.78) 
     
# observations  1736 1060 1166 
Adj. R
2 0.15 0.13 0.14 
     
Panel estimates with cross-sectional fixed effects and period fixed effects; t-statistics in 
parentheses, calculated with White period standard errors. 
 
3.2 Inflation uncertainty 
The probability approach explained above also allows for the estimation of the 
standard deviation of the distribution of inflation expectations, see equation (3). 
Below, this estimate will be used as our indication of inflation uncertainty. Before 
turning to the empirical findings, we first need, however, to clarify the concept of 
inflation uncertainty.  
  18 
The empirical literature identifies two very different approaches in measuring 
inflation uncertainty or inflation volatility. The time-series approach utilizes 
(G)ARCH models to estimate the time-varying conditional volatility of inflation, see 
e.g. Engle (1982). Basically, this approach tries to econometrically identify clusters of 
large or small inflation shocks in order to estimate the variance of inflation in the next 
period. In contrast, the cross-sectional approach uses information on (dis)agreement 
about the inflation outlook among different forecasters at one point in time to assess 
inflation uncertainty. Our measure of inflation uncertainty belongs to the latter 
approach. In general, the two approaches do not yield comparable results, see e.g. 
Giordani and Söderlind (2003).  
 
Apart from the distinction between the time-series and cross-sectional approaches, a 
further complication concerns the proper interpretation of inflation uncertainty in the 
Eurozone. In the Consumer Survey, the European Commission calculates aggregate 
replies to the questionnaires as weighted averages of the country-aggregate replies. It 
is not clear, however, whether the resulting Eurozone aggregate has a straightforward 
interpretation. It would assume that economic agents (consumers or investors) care 
about the inflation uncertainty regarding a European consumer price index, which is 
calculated as a weighted average of national price developments. If we maintain the 
more plausible assumption that economic agents consume locally, then the national 
consumer price indices may be better proxies for the price increase in their 
consumption basket. This perspective questions the relevance of analyzing inflation 
uncertainty at the Eurozone level using a aggregate consumer price index for the 
Eurozone. If investors and consumers still consume a local basket of goods, which is 
  19presumably better represented by the national consumer price index than by a 
European one, inflation uncertainty is still a national experience.  
 
It therefore makes sense to look at the cross-sectional estimates of national inflation 
uncertainty, based on the probability approach outlined in Section 2. In Figure 4, each 
time-series corresponds to the standard deviation of the national distribution of 
inflation expectations by survey consumers. The figure shows a remarkable increase 
in uncertainty for most countries in the period 2000-2002. Moreover, Figure 5, which 
plots the average standard deviations for a group of large (Germany, France, Spain 
and Italy) and a group of small EMU countries (all other countries) suggests that the 
small countries have born the brunt of this increase in inflation uncertainty.  
Figure 4: Cross-sectional within-country inflation uncertainty based on constructed 
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  20Figure 5: Cross-sectional within-country inflation uncertainty based on constructed 
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Again, we check for the robustness of our results by using an uncertainty measure that 
does not depend on the quantitative estimates of expected inflation. In Figure 6, we 
plot the proportions of extreme responses (in categories 1 and 5) averaged for the 
groups of small and large EMU countries. A higher proportion of extreme responses 
implies that consumers expect more change in the development of prices, either 
upwards or downwards. Although this is more a measure of price instability rather 
than inflation uncertainty, it still offers some interesting insights.  
 
Figure 6 shows that in the early days of EMU, consumers in small Member States 
were expecting much more change in the direction of price developments than 
consumers in the four largest Member States. Consumers in the larger countries were 
apparently more confident in the ability of the ECB to keep prices stable in their 
country than consumers in smaller countries. Given that ECB interest rate setting is 
based on aggregate Eurozone data, this result makes intuitive sense. Inflation shocks 
  21in small EMU countries have a smaller effect on EMU inflation than those in large 
Member States because of their smaller weight in the aggregate data. As a result, the 
ECB interest rates will react more strongly in setting interest rates to stabilize 
inflation in large countries compared to small countries. 
Figure 6: Proportion of extreme survey responses (categories 1 and 5): large vs small 
   
EMU countries 
The probability estimates of inflation uncertainty are next used to investigate the link 
between national inflation (πi) and national inflation uncertainty (σπ,t,i). This 
relationship has been the subject of much empirical research, see e.g. Grier and Perry 
(1998). The macroeconomic policy game literature has provided much of the 
theoretical background on the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty. 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), for example, argue that more uncertainty about 
money growth and inflation provides monetary authorities with the opportunity to 
create unexpected inflation with the aim of stimulating economic growth, thereby 
increasing the average inflation rate. More appealing perhaps is Ball’s (1992) theory, 
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  22minimal costs to keep it low. This results in a low and stable inflation. In contrast, 
when inflation is high, uncertainty will grow about whether policymakers will adopt 
costly disinflationary policies and about their time and impact.  
 
Monetary policymaking can no longer explain the link between inflation and inflation 
able 5 shows that the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty is 
uncertainty within a monetary union. But maybe the lack of monetary policy can. For 
economic agents in small regions which are hit by positive inflation shocks, it will be 
uncertain how and when the increase in inflation will be reversed. This results from 
imperfect information on the macroeconomic adjustment mechanism combined with 
the absence of a central bank dedicated to stabilizing their regional inflation rate. This 
does not hold true for the larger regions in the union, who have a larger weight in 
aggregate inflation and may therefore count on the price stability objective of the 
union’s central bank.  
 
T
maintained within the Eurozone. Using the same three sample periods as in subsection 
3.1, Table 5 reports positive and significant regression coefficients for all three 
specifications. The interaction term (πi*DEMU) shows that EMU has had little 
influence on this relationship, except for the sample including Greece. As the Greek 
data show high inflation and inflation uncertainty in the pre-EMU period, it is 
unsurprising that including Greece leads to a weakening of the link, as Greek inflation 
had to come down significantly after 1999 to qualify for EMU entry in 2001. Table 6 
reports again the results of our robustness check. Using the proportions of extreme 
responses as a measure of price instability, two out of three regressions show a 
  23significant and positive link between inflation and the proportion of extreme 
responses. 
Table 5: The relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty 
period:  1986.07-2004.09 1995.12-2004.09 1995.12-2004.09 
countries:  EMU excluding EL  EMU excluding  FI, 
AT, EL  EMU 
dependent variable: σπ,t,i σπ,t,i σπ,t,i
explanatory 
variables:     
Intercept  0.058 0.016 -0.022 
  (1.86) (0.41) (0.76) 
πi 0.253 0.308 0.403 
  (26.21) (7.44) (13.59) 
πi*DEMU 0.005 -0.036 -0.127 
  (0.36) (0.94) (3.72) 
     
#  erv obs ations  1736 1060 1166 
Adj. R
2 0.93 0.87 0.92 
     
Panel estimates with cross-sectional fixed effects and period fix d effec tatistics in 
calculated with White period standard errors. 
 survey responses 




Table 6: The relationship between inflation and extreme
period: 
countries:  EMU excluding EL  EMU excluding  FI, 
AT, EL  EMU 
Dependent 
variable: 
Ex π,t,i Extremes π,t,i Extremes π,t,i tremes
explanatory 
variables:     
Intercept  0.138 0.131 0.138 
  (15.22) (17.94) (17.14) 
πi 0.008 0.008 0.023 
  (2.38) (1.25) (4.69) 
πi*DEMU 0.006 0.004 -0.104 
  (1.02) (0.48) (1.65) 
     
# observations  1736 1060 1166 
Adj. R
2 0.61 0.56 0.66 
     
Panel estimates with cross- nal fixed effect iod f xed eff -statistics 
theses, calculated with White period standard errors 
sectio s and per i ects; t
in paren
 
  24We additionally provide some more evidence on the link between country size and 
inflation uncertainty, supporting the evidence in Figures 5 and 6. As explained above, 
it is straightforward to deduct this link within a monetary union. Before EMU, 
national central banks could still use the interest rate instrument to manage national 
inflation expectations and national inflation uncertainty. Since EMU, this 
management is no longer possible. Table 7 shows the absence of a relationship 
between country size and national inflation uncertainty, measured by both the mean 
and standard deviation of σπ,t,i, before EMU. In contrast, for the EMU sample period 
the rank correlations are much higher and more significant.  
Table 7: Country size and inflation uncertainty 
   1995:12-1998:12  1999:01-2004:08 
 Size Mean σπ,t,i Stdev σπ,t,i Mean σπ,t,i Stdev σπ,t,i
       
AT  3%  0.55 0.23 0.58 0.29 
BE  4%  0.41 0.14 0.58 0.27 
DE  34% 0.36 0.11 0.34 0.13 
EL  2%  2.69 0.56 1.11 0.32 
ES  9%  0.55 0.22 0.62 0.14 
FI  2%  0.35 0.17 0.57 0.41 
FR  21% 0.43 0.19 0.46 0.17 
IE  1%  0.49 0.17 0.99 0.45 
IT  16% 1.12 0.46 0.79 0.17 
NL  5%  0.69 0.10 0.96 0.43 
PT  2%  0.54 0.25 0.75 0.22 
        
Rank correlation   0.00  -0.18  -0.52  -0.77 
with  country  size      
t-statistic 0.00  0.54  1.81
*  3.63
**
      
* and 
** indicate significance at respectively 10% and 5% level. 
 
3.3 Short-term versus long-term inflation expectations 
The findings reported above show that short-term inflation expectations based on the 
Consumer Survey data lack the convergence which is present in the short-term 
inflation expectations of Consensus Forecasts used by the ECB. Whereas the cross-
  25sectional dispersion in ex ante real interest rates using the Consensus data is 30-35% 
lower than the dispersion using actual inflation rates (see Table 1), dispersion 
measured using the inflation expectations from the Consumer Survey roughly equals 
actual dispersion (see Figure 3). As hypothesized above, this suggests that the 
professional economists of the Consensus Forecasts are more inclined to incorporate 
the implications of monetary union for the convergence in inflation rates than 
ordinary consumers responding to the Consumer Survey. Given the limited nature of 
the Consumer Survey, it is impossible to test whether the same conclusion holds for 
longer time horizons.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has used the European Commission’s Consumer Survey to examine 1) the 
dispersion in expected inflation rates across EMU Member States, 2) the convergence 
in expected inflation over time and 3) the developments in inflation uncertainty in 
EMU Member States. What can we conclude from the European Commission’s 
Consumer Survey? Should the common monetary policy in EMU take into account 
the situation in individual countries? We conclude that, although significant beta-
convergence has occurred in inflation rates, balance scores and constructed inflation 
expectations, there is no evidence that EMU has speeded up the process of 
convergence in inflation expectations. In contrast, the data suggest that after strong 
convergence in the run-up to EMU, convergence in expected inflation has become 
weaker since. Also, the convergence in inflation expectations is not more pronounced 
that the convergence in actual inflation rates. This contradicts the ECB’s (2004) 
  26findings that dispersion in ex ante real interest rates is lower than that in ex post real 
interest rates. 
 
Finally, our analysis of inflation uncertainty demonstrates that the widely accepted 
link between the level of inflation and the extent of inflation uncertainty still holds 
within EMU. In addition, we show that since the introduction of the Euro a new 
relationship has arisen between inflation uncertainty and country size. The latter 
finding is of special interest to investors residing in small EMU Member States. While 
these investors have witnessed an increase in inflation uncertainty since EMU, their 
ability to hedge this risk has been reduced. For fixed income instruments denominated 
in Euro, the inflation risk which is priced in reflects the inflation risk of investors 
across the Eurozone, including investors in large EMU countries that have not 
witnessed a similar increase in inflation risk. Inflation uncertainty in small EMU 
countries seems higher than what is socially desirable. This suggests that there may be 
a demand for inflation-protected securities aimed specifically at investors in small 
EMU countries. Although index-linked bonds indexed to French and Eurozone 
inflation are available, similar instruments indexed to national inflation rates in many 
small EMU countries are still lacking.  
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